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Testing the effects of explicit and implicit
bidimensional attitudes on objectively measured
speeding behaviour
Rebecca McCartan* , Mark A. Elliott, Stefania Pagani,
Eimear Finnegan and Steve W. Kelly
School of Psychological Sciences and Health, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
Bidimensional attitudes have been shown to independently predict behaviour, with the
positive dimension of attitude being a stronger predictor of behaviour than the negative
dimension (e.g., Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015, Br. J. Psychol, 106, 656). However, this
positivity bias has been demonstrated with explicit attitude measures only and explicit
attitude measures tap deliberative processes rather than automatic processes, which are
known to be important in the execution of many behaviours. The aim of this study was to
test whether implicit bidimensional attitudes can account for variance in speeding
behaviour over and above explicit bidimensional attitudes and whether the positivity bias
that is typically foundwith explicit attitudes generalizes to implicit attitudes. A total of 131
drivers completed a questionnaire measuring their explicit bidimensional attitudes
towards speeding. They also completed Implicit Association Tests measuring their
implicit bidimensional attitudes. Two weeks later, speeding behaviour was measured
using a driving simulator. Explicit attitudes accounted for a significant proportion of the
variance in subsequent speeding behaviour. Implicit attitudes accounted for a statistically
significant increment to explained variance. The positive dimension of both explicit and
implicit attitudes predicted speeding behaviour but the negative dimensions did not.
Theoretical implications for understanding the potential attitudinal causes of behaviour
and practical implications for behaviour-change interventions are discussed.
Attitudes are typically treated as unidimensional predictors of behavioural intentions and
subsequent behaviour (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2001; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In line
with traditional conceptualizations of the attitude construct (e.g., Osgood, Suci, &
Tannenbaum, 1957; Thurstone, 1928), this means that individuals are held to evaluate
behaviours along a single, bipolar, positive–negative dimension (e.g., ‘For me, speeding is
negative or positive’). The likelihood of a behaviour being performed is then held to
increase with the extent to which it is evaluated positively rather than negatively (e.g.,
Fishbein, 1963). More recently, however, attitudes have been conceptualized as
bidimensional predictors of behaviour (Elliott, Brewster, Thomson, Malcolm, &
Rasmussen, 2015; McCartan & Elliott, 2018). This means that attitudes comprise separate
unipolar, positive, and negative dimensions (e.g., ‘For me, speeding is not at all positive to
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extremely positive’ and ‘For me, speeding is not at all negative to extremely negative’).
The likelihood of a behaviour being performed is then held to increase with the extent to
which it is evaluated positively and, at the same time, the extent to which it is not
evaluated negatively. In this article, we present a study inwhichwe tested these effects of
bidimensional attitudes on drivers’ speeding behaviour. In line with recent research, we
aimed to test the effects of explicit, questionnaire-based measures of bidimensional
attitudes on subsequent behaviour. We also aimed to extend previous research by testing
the extent to which implicit, cognitive test-based measures of bidimensional attitudes
could increase the prediction of subsequent behaviour over and above the explicit
measures.
Traditionally, attitudes have been conceptualized as unidimensional evaluations that
aremeasured on single, bipolar scales (Allport, 1935). Several researchers, however, have
questioned the singularity of the attitude construct and have distinguished between
different components of attitudes. In particular, it is common for researchers (e.g., Elliott
& Thomson, 2010; Elliott, Thomson, Robertson, Stephenson, & Wicks, 2013; Lawton,
Conner, & McEachan, 2009; Rhodes, Blanchard, & Matheson, 2006) to distinguish
between cognitive attitudes (positive or negative instrumental evaluations; e.g., ‘For me,
speeding is harmful/beneficial’) and affective attitudes (e.g., positive or negative
emotional evaluations; e.g., ‘For me, speeding is enjoyable/unenjoyable’). In both cases,
however, attitudes are treated as unidimensional (i.e., positive or negative). This
unidimensionality has previously attracted criticism (e.g., Kaplan, 1972) because it makes
themidpoint of an attitude scale ambiguous, indicating either attitudinal indifference (i.e.,
a state that occurs when a behaviour is simultaneously evaluated as neither positive nor
negative) or attitudinal ambivalence (i.e., a state that occurs when a behaviour is
simultaneously evaluated as both positive and negative). As a solution to this problem,
Kaplan (1972) recommended splitting the single positive/negative attitude dimension at
its midpoint, thus producing a positive dimension and a separate negative dimension (i.e.,
bidimensional attitudes). Operationally, Kaplan (1972) recommended the split semantic
differential technique as a method for measuring the two attitude dimensions because it
allows individuals to evaluate the positive and negative attributes (consequences) of a
behaviour independently on separate (positive and negative) unipolar scales, thereby
acknowledging the possibility that positive and negative attitudes towards the same
behaviour can coexist (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995).
In support of the bidimensional conceptualization of an attitude, factor analytic studies
have demonstrated that positive and negative behavioural evaluations load separately
onto two independent dimensions (e.g., Conner et al., 2002). However, attitudes have
continued to be treated as unidimensional constructs when testing the relationships
between attitudes, on the one hand, and measures of behavioural intentions or
subsequent behaviour, on the other hand (for reviews, see McEachan, Conner, Taylor,
& Lawton, 2011; Wallace, Paulson, Lord, & Bond, 2005). Even in studies of attitudinal
ambivalence (for a review, see Conner & Sparks, 2002), a primary focus has been to
demonstrate that evaluative conflict between the separate positive and negative attitude
dimensions (i.e., attitude ambivalence) moderates the relationship between overall (i.e.,
unidimensional) measures of attitudes, on the one hand, and measures of behavioural
intentions or subsequent behaviour, on the other hand, with greater evaluative conflict
leading to poorer attitude–behaviour relationships (see Conner & Sparks, 2002). The
rationale is that the evaluative conflict, which stems from simultaneously evaluating a
behaviour as both positive and negative, is indicative of weak attitudes, which are poor
predictors of behaviour (Glasman & Albarracın, 2006; Kraus, 1995).
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Notwithstanding the importance of research on attitudinal ambivalence, a serious
acceptance of the bidimensional conceptualization of attitudes requires that the positive
and negative dimensions are treated as independent predictors of behaviour. While it is
conceptually redundant to treat attitude ambivalence as a moderator of these relation-
ships (i.e., it is circular to reason that a measure based on two independent constructs
should moderate the effects of those same constructs on an outcome),1 treating the
separate positive and negative attitude dimensions as independent predictors of
behaviour is important nonetheless. It allows researchers to test potential differences
between their predictive validities, which has important implications for better
understanding behaviour (i.e., which attitude dimension is the better predictor of
behaviour?) and the development of effective interventions (i.e., which attitude
dimension might need prioritizing in behaviour-change efforts?).
Recent research in which attitudes have been treated as bidimensional predictors of
behaviour (Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015; McCartan & Elliott, 2018) has shown that
both the positive and negative attitude dimensions independently predict binge-
drinking intentions (Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015 [studies 1 and 2]), smoking and
unhealthy dieting intentions (Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015 [study 2]), self-reported
speeding behaviour (Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015 [study 3]), and objectivity measured
speeding behaviour (McCartan & Elliott, 2018). These studies have also shown that the
positive dimension of attitude is a significantly stronger predictor of both intentions
and subsequent behaviour than is the negative dimension. This finding is in line with
the majority of previous studies on expectancy beliefs (precursors to attitudes) in
which beliefs about the likelihood of positive behavioural outcomes have been found
to predict behaviour to a greater extent than beliefs about the likelihood of negative
behavioural outcomes. For example, Lee, Greely, and Oei (1999) found that positive
expectancy beliefs accounted for more variance in binge-drinking behaviour than did
negative expectancy beliefs. Lawton, Conner, and Parker (2007 [study 2]) found that
positive expectancy beliefs had larger standardized regression weights than did
negative expectancy beliefs in the prediction of smoking behaviour (also see Anderson,
Pollak, & Wetter, 2002). Similarly, Rhodes and Conner (2010) found that positive
expectancy beliefs had larger standardized regression weights than did negative
expectancy beliefs in the prediction of physical activity intentions, in particular for
affective rather than cognitive and proximal rather than distal outcomes. Furthermore,
Fromme, Katz, and Rivet (1997) found that positive expectancy beliefs had larger
standardized regression weights than did negative expectancy beliefs in the prediction
of a range of behaviours including drug-use, heavy-drinking, and engagement in illegal
activities such as drink driving. Although Lawton et al. (2007 [study 1]) found that
expectancy beliefs about negative affective outcomes had larger standardized regres-
sion weights in the prediction of speeding behaviour than did expectancy beliefs about
positive affective outcomes, the findings of previous research, overall, suggest a
‘positivity bias’ in behavioural decision-making (e.g., Boucher & Osgood, 1969). With
regard to bidimensional attitudes, evaluations of positive behavioural outcomes
1Note that this conceptual redundancy also manifests statistically. For instance, when a measure of attitude ambivalence was
calculated in this study, following standard practice (e.g., Thompson et al., 1995), 100% of its variance was predicted by the
positive and negative attitude dimensions. Analyses testing the moderating effects of attitude ambivalence on the relationships
between the positive and negative attitude dimensions, on the one hand, and behaviour, on the other hand, were therefore not only
conceptually redundant but also not possible due to perfect collinearity (e.g., Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).
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outweigh evaluations of negative behavioural outcomes in the prediction of behaviour
(but see Lawton et al., 2007 [study 1]).
A potential limitation of the above cited studies, however, is that they have all focused
exclusively on explicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes are attitudes of which an individual is
consciously aware. Consequently, they are held to influence behaviour through a
deliberative process, with individuals consciously considering the positive and negative
outcomes of a behaviour before engaging in it (e.g., Elliott, Lee, Robertson, & Innes, 2015;
Fazio & Olson, 2003; Fazio, 1990; Spalding & Hardin, 1999). This raises two potential
concerns. First, many real-world behaviours (e.g., speeding) are readily repeatable and are
therefore afforded the opportunity to become automatic. This means that spontaneous
processes are likely to be involved in the execution of behaviour in addition to more
deliberative processes (e.g., Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). Second, explicit attitudes are
typically measured using self-report questionnaires, which can be susceptible to various
cognitive biases, such as primary and recency effects (Murdock, 1962), affective biases
such as mood congruent memory effects (e.g., Mayer, McCormick, & Strong, 1995), and
self-presentation biases such as self-deception (Gur & Sackeim, 1979) and impression
management (Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Implicitly measured attitudes help to overcome
these potential problems. This is because implicit attitudes are attitudes of which
individuals arenot consciously aware. Consequently, they are held to influence behaviour
through a spontaneous, rather than adeliberative, process.More specifically, they are held
to be activated spontaneouslywhen individuals encounter salient cues that are associated
with a behaviour. These automatically activated attitudes are then held to exert a biasing
effect on an individual, effectively priming (initiating rapidly and without conscious
awareness) attitude-congruent behaviour (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Olson, 2003). In
addition, implicit attitudes are not vulnerable to self-reporting biases because they are
measured by performance on cognitive tests, rather than self-report questionnaires (e.g.,
Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001).
The most commonly employed method for measuring implicit attitudes is the
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald,
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; but see Fazio, 2001 for an alternative method). The IAT is a
computer-based reaction time task that assesses the strength of associations between
‘target concepts’ (e.g., behaviours) and ‘attributes’ (e.g., evaluations). In a standard,
traditional IAT, a target concept (e.g., speeding) is presented on one side of a
computer screen and its opposite concept (e.g., complying) is presented on the other
side. Each concept is paired with an attribute (e.g., speeding/good; complying/bad).
The participants are presented with items in the middle of the screen relating to both
the concepts (e.g., illegal or legal) and the attributes (e.g., happy or nasty). The
participants’ task is to categorize each item into its relevant category as quickly and
accurately as possible (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998). A measure of attitude (e.g.,
towards speeding) is then derived from the difference in the participants’ response
latencies (i.e., time taken to categorize items) in ‘compatible trials’, when the target
concept is paired with ‘good’ and its opposite concept is paired with ‘bad’, and their
response latencies in the ‘incompatible trials’, when the target concept is paired with
‘bad’ and its opposite concept is paired with ‘good’ (Greenwald et al., 1998, 2003).
The rationale is that faster response latencies in compatible relative to incompatible
trials indicate a positive attitude towards the target concept.
As an example, imagine a driver with a positive attitude towards speeding. This driver
would be able to more quickly categorize items in an IAT when ‘speeding’ is paired with
‘good’ and ‘complying’ is paired with ‘bad’ (i.e., the compatible trials) than when
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‘speeding’ is pairedwith ‘bad’ and ‘complying’ is pairedwith ‘good’ (i.e., the incompatible
trials). This is because his or her pre-existing cognitive association between ‘speeding’ and
‘good’ (i.e., his or her positive attitude towards speeding) is facilitating task performance
in the compatible trials and inhibiting it in the incompatible trials (e.g., Greenwald et al.,
1998). On the other hand, a driver with a negative attitude towards speeding would be
able to more quickly categorize items in an IAT when ‘speeding’ is paired with ‘bad’ and
‘complying’ is paired with ‘good’ than when ‘speeding’ is paired with ‘good’ and
‘complying’ is paired with ‘bad’. This is because his or her pre-existing cognitive
association between ‘speeding’ and ‘bad’ (i.e., his or her negative attitude towards
speeding) is facilitating task performance in the incompatible trials and inhibiting it in the
compatible trials.
Several studies have demonstrated that implicit attitudes can predict health-risk
behaviours, such as smoking (Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Seo, & Macy, 2010), binge-
drinking (Houben, Havermans, & Wiers, 2010), and speeding (Hatfield, Fernandes,
Faunce, & Job, 2008). However, these studies have all focused on unidimensional rather
than bidimensional measures of attitudes, using IATs such as the one described above.
Given the findings from studies of explicit bidimensional attitudes, it seems plausible that
implicit attitudes will also have separate positive and negative dimensions that
independently predict behaviour. One aim of this research therefore was to measure
implicit bidimensional attitudes and test the extent to which they predict subsequent
behaviour. We focused on drivers’ speeding behaviour because it is a behaviour that
typically results in both positive and negative outcomes and therefore tends to generate
both positive and negative dimensions of attitudes (e.g., Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan,
2005). Additionally, speeding is a prominent cause of road traffic accidents and casualties
(Department for Transport, 2016). Research that identifies potentially modifiable
predictors of speeding (e.g., attitudes) is therefore important for understanding this
behaviour and finding ways to reduce it.
An additional aim of this study was to explore the relative effects of implicit and
explicit attitudes in the prediction of behaviour. Understanding the interplay between
deliberative and automatic decision-making in the prediction of behaviour is particularly
important for behaviours such as speeding because both types of processes are likely to
influence action. For example, in certain situations (e.g., driving on a road with a speed
camera), deliberative decision-making, reflected in explicit attitudes, is likely to dictate
behaviour. However, in other situations (e.g., driving on a well-rehearsed journey in
which nothing out of the ordinary occurs and does not therefore require high levels of
conscious deliberation), automatic decision-making, reflected in implicit attitudes, is
likely to dictate behaviour.
Several studies have examined the effects of both implicit and explicit attitudes on
behaviour (e.g., Gawronski, Galdi, & Arcuri, 2015; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, &
Banaji, 2009; Spence&Townsend, 2010). Ameta-analysis of k = 152 independent studies
by Greenwald et al. (2009) found that implicit attitudes accounted for an increment to
explained variance in behaviour over and above the variance accounted for by explicit
attitudes, and both types of attitude accounted for unique variance in behaviour.
However, no previous studies have simultaneously tested the predictive validity of
implicit and explicit attitudes on speeding and no studies have tested the effects of both
implicit and explicit bidimensional attitudes on any behaviour. It was expected in this
study that implicit bidimensional attitudes would predict speeding behaviour over and
above explicit bidimensional attitudes.
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In line with the above discussion, the aim of this research was to test the effects of
implicit bidimensional attitudes on behaviour over and above the effects of explicit
bidimensional attitudes. In linewith previous research (e.g., Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015;
McCartan & Elliott, 2018), hypothesis 1 was that the positive and negative dimensions of
explicit attitudes would account for a significant proportion of the variance in behaviour,
with the positive dimension being the stronger predictor. Hypothesis 2 was that the
positive and negative dimensions of implicit attitudes would account for a significant
increment to explained variance in behaviour, with the positive dimension again being
the stronger predictor.
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty-one active drivers (full UK driving licence holders who drove
at least once a week) took part. The participants were recruited using advertisements
placed on notice boards around the campus of a large university in the West of
Scotland and online posts (e.g., advertisements on social networking sites and the
virtual learning environment of the university). The mean age of the sample was
22.66 (SD = 8.50; range = 18–65), and 21.4% was male (N = 28). The mean weekly
mileage was 74.81 (SD = 75.90; range = 1–400), and the mean number of years that
the participants had held a full driving licence for was 4.09 (SD = 6.84; range = 0.16–
38).
Power analysis indicated that the power provided by the present sample (n = 131) to
detect a meaningful (small to moderate) sized relationship (r = .22 for correlation and
f2 = .10 for regression with four independent variables) was power = 0.82. Given the
power estimate was above 0.80 (see Cohen, 1992), it was concluded that the present
study was sufficiently powered for testing the hypotheses.
Design and procedure
A prospective design was used. The participants were invited to participate after being
informed the study was a general-purpose investigation into driver behaviour and
attitudes. All of the participants were invited to the social cognition laboratory situated in
the School of Psychological Sciences and Health. After providing their consent, the
participants completed a questionnaire that contained standard items to measure basic
demographic information (e.g., age, gender, weekly mileage, number of years licensed to
drive) and explicit attitudes towards exceeding the speed limit (both the positive and
negative dimensions, separately). The participants also completed IATs to measure their
implicit attitudes towards exceeding the speed limit (again, both the positive and negative
dimensions, separately). The questionnaire took approximately 5 min to complete and
was developed and administered using Qualtrics. The IATs took approximately 15 min to
complete and were developed and administered using E-Prime. Half of the participants
received the questionnaire first and half received the IATs first to control for any potential
order effects.
Two weeks later, the participants were invited to the Driving Research Laboratory
situated in the School of Psychological Sciences and Health where objective measures of
speeding were obtained from a driving simulator. After completing the simulator drive,
the participants were thanked and debriefed.
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The explicit attitude measures
Explicit attitudes were measured using standard questionnaire items (i.e., commonly
employed in the literature and shown to procedure reliable measures). The participants
were asked to respond to the items that measured their attitudes towards exceeding the
speed limit using 9-point scales. All attitude items were presented in a pseudo-random
order,with the response scales reversed for half the items to reduce response set bias (e.g.,
Nederhof, 1985). These measures were presented amongst ‘filler items’ asking the
participants about their general driving practices (e.g., how often they drive in urban
areas) to help prevent consistency biases (e.g., Budd, 1987) from influencing the
participants’ responses.
The split semantic differential technique (Kaplan, 1972) was used to measure the
separate positive and negative dimensions of attitude. Four items were used to measure
the positive dimension. The participants were asked to ‘Think only about the positive/
rewarding/beneficial/pleasant outcomes that you associate with speeding’ and to rate
‘How positive/rewarding/beneficial/pleasant are they?’ The participants’ ratings were
provided on scales from ‘not at all positive/rewarding/beneficial/pleasant’ (scored 1) to
‘extremely positive/rewarding/beneficial/pleasant’ (scored 9). The mean of the four
items was calculated and used as the final measure of the explicit positive attitude
dimension. The Cronbach’s alpha was a = .88 and therefore was judged to possess
internal reliability (i.e., a > .70; Cronbach, 1951; Nunnaly, 1978). Higher scores indicated
that the positive outcomes of speeding were rated more positively.
Four items were also used to measure the negative dimension of attitude. The
participants were asked to ‘Think only about the negative/unrewarding/harmful/
unpleasant outcomes that you associate with speeding’ and to rate ‘How negative/
unrewarding/harmful/unpleasant are they?’ The ratings were provided on a scale from
‘not at all negative/unrewarding/harmful/unpleasant’ (scored 1) to ‘extremely negative/
unrewarding/harmful/unpleasant’ (scored 9). The mean of the four items provided a
reliable final measure of the explicit negative attitude dimension (Cronbach’s a = .73).
Higher scores indicated that the negative outcomes of speeding were rated more
negatively.
The implicit attitude measures
A standard IAT, as described in the Introduction, is appropriate for measuring implicit
unidimensional attitudes (i.e., positive or negative associations). However, ‘single-
attribute’ IATs (e.g., Penke, Eichstaedt, & Asendorpf, 2006) are required to measure the
separate positive and negative dimensions of implicit bidimensional attitudes. Single-
attribute IATs are typically used when an attribute has no clear opposite category (e.g.,
sociosexuality: Penke et al., 2006). However, single-attribute IATs have not previously
been used to measure bidimensional attitudes. Single-attribute IATs were therefore
developed to measure implicit bidimensional attitudes in this research.
The single-attribute IAT to measure the positive dimension of attitude comprised five
blocks of ‘trials’ (see Table 1). In block 1, the participants were shown a screen. The
target-concept category ‘speeding’ was presented at the top of one side of the screen.
The opposite-concept category ‘complying’ was presented at the top of the other side of
the screen. The participants were then shown a series of items in the centre of the screen
that either belonged to the ‘speeding’ or ‘complying’ concept categories. The participants
were asked to correctly categorize these items as quickly and accurately as possible. The
participants were presented with five items related to ‘speeding’ (fast, rush, speeding,
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illegal, and disobey) and five items related to ‘complying’ (slow, cautious, adhere, legal,
and comply). Each item was presented twice, meaning that there were 20 trials in total.
The participants were asked to press the ‘E’ key on the computer keyboard when item
belonged to the concept category on the left of the screen and topress the ‘I’ keywhen the
item belonged to the category on the right. The items remained on the screen until a
responsewas given and, if an incorrect responsewas given (e.g., if a speeding-related item
was categorized as ‘complying’), an X appeared in the centre of the screen until the
correct response was provided.
In block 2, the participants were presented with the same display as in block 1,
except that the single-attribute category ‘good’ was paired with the concept category
at the top left of the screen. The participants were then presented with the same
series of ‘speeding’/’complying’ items used in block 1. They were also presented with
five items related to the attribute category ‘good’ (happy, fun, wonderful, positive,
and enjoyable). Each of the items from the concept and attribute categories
(‘speeding’, ‘complying’, and ‘good’) was presented at least once. Five of the items
were shown twice. Of these items, three items belonged to the concept category on
the left side of the screen, one belonged to the concept category on the right, and
one belonged to the attribute category. This meant that block 2 comprised 20 trials
and the number of items that the participants needed to categorize on the left and
right sides of the screen was proportional to the number of categories. As in block 1,
the participants were asked to press ‘E’ on the keyboard when the item belonged a
category on the left of the screen and ‘I’ when it belonged to the category on the
right.
In block 3, the participants completed the same task as in block 2 except that they
needed to classify twice asmany items (i.e., therewere 40 trials in block 3). In blocks 4 and
5, the participants were given the same tasks as in blocks 2 and 3 except that the attribute
category ‘good’ was paired with the concept category on the right rather than the left of
the screen.
There were two different versions of this single-target IAT. In version 1, the target-
concept category ‘speeding’ was presented on the left-hand side of the screen and the
opposite-concept category ‘complying’ was on the right. In version 2, this was reversed.
Half of the participants were selected at random to receive version 1, and half were
selected at random to receive version 2 to counterbalance across the sample. This
procedure was used to address the commonly found order effect in IAT research, with
performance on the compatible or incompatible trials being faster when it is completed
first (i.e., blocks 2 and 3) comparedwithwhen it is completed second (i.e., blocks 4 and 5;
e.g., Greenwald et al., 2003). In both IATs, the intertrial interval (milliseconds between
Table 1. Sequence of trial blocks for single-attribute Implicit Association Test (IAT) measuring the
positive dimension of attitude
Block
No. of trials
(i.e., words per block) Function
Top left of screen
in version 1 of the IAT
Top right of screen
in version 1 of the IAT
1 20 Practice Speeding Complying
2 20 Practice Speeding + Good Complying
3 40 Test Speeding + Good Complying
4 20 Practice Speeding Complying + Good
5 40 Test Speeding Complying + Good
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each trial) used was 250 ms, consistent with standard practice (e.g., Greenwald et al.,
2003).
Regardless of which version of the IAT the participants received, the response
latencies to the blocks in which the attribute category was paired with the ‘speeding’
target-concept category (commonly referred to as ‘compatible trials’) and the blocks in
which it was paired with the ‘complying’ opposite-concept category (commonly referred
to as ‘incompatible trials’) were used to derive a ‘D-score’ (see Greenwald et al., 2003).
This D-score served as the implicit measure of the positive attitude dimension. Following
Greenwald et al. (2003), themean response latencies (the time inmilliseconds it took for
participants to correctly classify each item) for the compatible trials were subtracted from
the mean response latencies for the incompatible trials, meaning that higher scores
equated to faster categorization of items when ‘good’ was paired with ‘speeding’ rather
than ‘complying’ (i.e., higher scores equated to more positive attitudes towards
speeding). The difference between the participants’ mean latencies of response in the
compatible versus incompatible trials was divided by the standard deviation across the
compatible and incompatible trials to produce an overall measure of effect size (i.e.,D). In
line with standard practice (i.e., Greenwald et al., 2003), this procedure was used to
calculate aD-score for blocks 2 versus 4 and 3 versus 5 separately and themean of the two
scores served as the final measure (D) of the positive dimension of the participants’
implicit attitudes towards speeding.2 The Cronbach’s alphas for versions 1 and 2 of this
IAT were a = .72 and a = .66, respectively. This meant that the Cronbach’s alpha for the
overall measure of the positive dimension of implicit attitudes was a = .69.
The negative dimension of implicit attitudeswas alsomeasured using a single-attribute
IAT (see Table 2). This IAT was the same as the one used to measure the positive
dimension of implicit attitudes except that the attribute category ‘bad’, rather than ‘good’,
was paired with the target-concept category ‘speeding’ and the opposite-concept
category ‘complying’ in blocks 2–5. In addition to correctly categorizing the items relating
to speeding and complying, the participants therefore had to correctly categorize items
relating to the attribute category ‘bad’ (evil, disaster, awful, negative and nasty). Once
again, there were two different versions of the IAT. In version 1, the opposite-concept
category ‘complying’ was presented on the left-hand side of the screen and the target-
Table 2. Sequence of trial blocks for single-attribute Implicit Association Test (IAT) measuring the
negative dimension of attitude
Block
No. of trials
(i.e., words per block) Function
Top left of screen
in version 1 of the IAT
Top right of screen
in version 1 of the IAT
1 20 Practice Complying Speeding
2 20 Practice Complying + Bad Speeding
3 40 Test Complying + Bad Speeding
4 20 Practice Complying Speeding + Bad
5 40 Test Complying Speeding + Bad
2 Blocks 2 and 4 are referred to as ‘practice blocks’ in the IAT literature, and blocks 3 and 5 are referred to as ‘test blocks’. While
some researchers treat blocks 2 and 4 as genuine practice bocks, Greenwald et al. (2003) recommend that they are used to
calculate the final IAT measure of attitudes along with blocks 3 and 5 on the basis it leads to larger correlations between implicit
and explicit attitude measures than when either the practice or test blocks are used on their own. We therefore followed this
accepted procedure. It should be noted, however, that the findings reported in this study were the same regardless of whether or
not the ‘practice blocks’ were used to calculate the implicit attitude measures.
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concept category ‘speeding’ was presented on the right. In version 2, this was reversed.
To counterbalance across the sample, the participants who received version 1 of the
IAT to measure the positive dimension of attitude received version 1 of this IAT.
Similarly, the participants who received version 2 of the IAT to measure the positive
dimension of attitude received version 2 of this IAT. To control for any potential
practice effects, the order in which the participants received their two IATs varied.
The participants either received the positive single-attribute IAT first or the negative
single-attribute IAT first.
A final measure of the negative dimension of the participants’ implicit attitudes
towards speeding was calculated following the same procedure as for the positive
dimension of their implicit attitudes. The mean of the response latencies in the
incompatible trials (‘bad’ paired with ‘complying’) was subtracted from the mean of the
response latencies in the compatible trials (‘bad’ paired with ‘speeding’), meaning that
higher scores reflected more negative attitudes towards speeding. This difference was
then divided by the standard deviation across the compatible and incompatible trials for
the ‘practice’ and ‘test’ blocks separately and the mean of the resulting Ds served as the
final measure (D) of the negative dimension of the participants’ implicit attitudes. The
Cronbach’s alphas for versions 1 and 2 of this IATwere a = .61 and a = .68, respectively.
Thismeant that the Cronbach’s alpha for the overall measure of the negative dimension of
implicit attitudes was a = .64).
It should be noted that the data from all IATs were trimmed following standard
procedures (Greenwald et al., 2003). All response latencies that were over 10,000 ms
were removed to ensure that the data were not contaminated by trials that were
‘abnormally slow’. Across all IATs, there were just n = 5 participants with response
latencies over 10,000 ms. In each case, the maximum number of abnormally slow trials
was just n = 2. These participants’ final D scores were calculated using the remaining
latencies. Greenwald et al. (2003) also recommend that participants should be removed
from the sample if more than 10% of their response latencies are <300 ms to prevent
contamination by ‘abnormally fast’ trials. In this study, there were no participants with
more than 10% of their trials <300 ms.
The speeding behaviour measure
The driving simulator used in this study was an interactive fixed-based driving simulator
modelled on the layout of a British car (i.e., right-hand drive). The simulator had threehigh-
resolution screens to the front, providing 210 degree visual field of view. The simulator
operated with an automatic transmission and had controls (e.g., a steering wheel,
indicators, clutch, brake, and accelerator) that are situated and operate as in a real-world
vehicle. The rear-view mirror was shown at the top of the centre screen, and a
speedometer and tachometer were shown at the bottom. The wing mirrors were shown
on the side screens.
The participants were initially given a 5-min practice drive to get used to the
simulator controls. Following the practice drive, the participants completed the trial
route, which comprised a 7.06-mile section of road through an urban environment,
taking approximately 15 min to complete. An urban environment was chosen because
most traffic crashes occur on roads in built-up areas (Department for Transport, 2016).
Prior to driving the trial route, the participants were told to treat the drive as if it were
a real drive in the real world. They were told that the speed limit was 30 mph and to
drive straight ahead (i.e., not to turn at any junctions). The measure of speeding
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behaviour used in the data analysis was the percentage of the trial route that the
participants spent driving over the 30 mph speed limit. This was operationalized as
30.50 mph or to prevent microfluctuations in speed around 30 mph from unduly
influencing the results.
Previous research (McCartan & Elliott, 2018) has shown that measures of speeding
behaviour obtained in the present driving simulator correlate well with self-reported
measures of speeding in the real world (r = .65, p < .001). The demographic and
sociocognitive variables that are typically associated with real-world speeding behaviour
and traffic-crash rates are also associated with speeding behaviour as measured on this
driving simulator. More specifically, accumulated research in road safety has shown that
age and driving experience are the key demographic predictors of both real-world
speeding and traffic-crash risk, with younger and less experienced drivers being found to
speed more often and have higher traffic-crash rates than older and more experienced
drivers (e.g., Department for Transport, 2016; McCartt, Mayhew, Braitman, Ferguson, &
Simpson, 2009; Stradling et al., 2003). Re-analyses of data from an independent study by
Brewster, Elliott, McCartan, McGregor, and Kelly (2016) showed that both these
demographic variables were reliable predictors of both mean speed (for age: b = .27,
p < .001; for driving experience: b = .25, p < .01) and the proportion of time that
participants spend driving over the speed limit (for age: b = .26, p < .01; for driving
experience: b = .23, p < .01) on this driving simulator. Conner et al. (2007 [study 2])
showed that the sociocognitive variables that predict on-road vehicle speeds in the real
world were behavioural intention (b = .35, p < .01), perceived behavioural control
(b = .03, p < .05), andmoral norm (b = .21, p < .05). Re-analysis of the data collected
by Brewster et al. (2016) showed that behavioural intention (b = .35, p < .01),
perceived behavioural control (b = .14, p < .05), and moral norm (b = .16, p < .05)
also predicted vehicle speed in this driving simulator.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations
The sample means, standard deviations, and correlations for the explicit and implicit
attitude measures and the measure of speeding behaviour are shown in Table 3. The
sample mean for the explicit positive attitude dimension was below the scale midpoint
(i.e., 5), which indicates that the participants did not, on average, explicitly evaluate the
positive outcomes of exceeding the speed limit very positively. The sample mean for the
explicit negative attitude dimension was towards the top end of the scale, indicating that
the participants, on average, explicitly evaluated the negative outcomes of exceeding the
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations for all attitude measures and speeding behaviour
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Mean (SD)
1. Behaviour – .53*** .30** .24** .07 26.70 (27.10)
2. Explicit positive – .52*** .05 .03 3.20 (1.86)
3. Explicit negative – .13 .02 7.53 (1.42)
4. Implicit positive – .14 0.16 (0.29)
5. Implicit negative – 0.22 (0.28)
Note. **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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speed limit as very negative. The samplemean for the implicit positive attitude dimension
was below zero, indicating that the participants, on average, did not have strong positive
implicit attitudes towards speeding. The sample mean for the implicit negative attitude
dimension, on the other hand, was greater than zero, indicating that the participants, on
average, had negative implicit attitudes towards speeding. The mean on the measure of
behaviour was 26.70, indicating that the participants, on average, exceeded the speed
limit for just over a quarter of the simulator drive.
The correlations in Table 3 show that the positive and negative dimensions of
explicit attitudes were negatively correlated, meaning that the more the participants
evaluated the positive outcomes of exceeding the speed limit as being positive, the
less they evaluated the negative outcomes as being negative. However, the correlation
was below r = .70, which is the conventionally accepted criterion for demonstrating
independence amongst constructs (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Similarly, the positive
and negative dimensions of implicit attitudes were independent because they were
not correlated significantly.
In line with expectations, the positive dimension of explicit attitudes was
positively correlated with behaviour (i.e., the more participants evaluated the positive
outcomes of exceeding the speed limit as positive, the more they exceeded the speed
limit) whereas the negative dimension of explicit attitude was negatively correlated
with behaviour. Similarly, the positive dimension of implicit attitudes was positively
correlated with behaviour. However, the negative dimension of implicit attitudes was
not.
Predicting behaviour using explicit and implicit measures of bidimensional attitudes
A two-step hierarchical multiple linear regression was conducted to test both hypotheses
1 and 2 (see Table 4). The dependent variable was the measure of speeding behaviour.
The independent variables at step 1were the explicit positive and negative dimensions of
attitude. The implicit positive and negative dimensions of attitude were added to the
regression at step 2.
In support of hypothesis 1, Table 4 shows that 28% of the variance in speeding
behaviour was account for at step 1 of the regression model. The positive dimension of
explicit attitudes was an independent predictor. The negative dimension of explicit
attitudes was not. Also in support of hypothesis 1, the positive dimension of explicit
Table 4. Hierarchical multiple linear regression predicting speeding behaviour from the explicit and
implicit positive and negative dimensions of attitude
Step Predictor R2 R2Change Fchange b at step 1 b at step 2
1. Explicit attitudes
Positive dimension .28 .28 23.96*** .51*** .51***
Negative dimension .04 .01
2. Implicit attitudes
Positive dimension .33 .05 4.628* – .22**
Negative dimension – .09
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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attitude had a significantly larger standardized regression coefficient than did the negative
dimension, t(125) = 5.36, p < .001.
In support of hypothesis 2, Table 4 also shows that there was a 5% increase to
explained variance in speeding behaviour at step 2 of the regression model.3 The
positive dimension of implicit attitude was an independent predictor. The negative
dimension of implicit attitude was not. Also in support of hypothesis 2, the positive
dimension of implicit attitude had a significantly larger standardized regression
coefficient than did the negative dimension, t(123) = 2.71, p < .01. The positive
dimension of explicit attitudes remained an independent predictor of behaviour at
step 2, and the negative dimension of explicit attitudes still did not predict behaviour.
Also at step 2, the positive dimension of explicit attitude still had a significantly larger
standardized regression coefficient than did the negative dimension of explicit
attitude, t(123) = 5.13, p < .001.4
Discussion
The aim of this research was to test the effects of implicit bidimensional attitudes on
drivers’ speeding behaviour over and above the effects of explicit bidimensional
attitudes. Hypothesis 1 was that the positive and negative dimensions of explicit
attitudes would account for a significant proportion of the variance in behaviour, with
the positive dimension being the stronger predictor. Hypothesis 2 was that the
positive and negative dimensions of implicit attitudes would account for a significant
increment to explained variance in behaviour, with the positive dimension being the
stronger predictor.
3 Research on unidimensional attitudes shows that affective attitudes are typically stronger predictors of behaviour than are
cognitive (instrumental) attitudes (e.g., Lawton et al., 2009) and that implicitly measured attitudes add little to the prediction of
behaviour over and above explicitly measured affective attitudes (e.g., Conner, Prestwich, & Ayres, 2011). This raises the
possibility that the additional variance accounted for at step 2 of the regressionmodel was due to the implicit measures containing
more affective than cognitive attribute items (i.e., each IAT required the participants to categorize four emotive attributes [e.g.,
‘happy’, ‘fun’, ‘wonderful’, and ‘enjoyable’] and just one instrumental attribute [e.g., ‘positive’]) and the explicit measures
containingmore cognitive than affective attitude items (i.e., the questionnaires required the participants to rate three instrumental
items [e.g., ‘positive’, ‘rewarding’ and ‘beneficial’] and just one affective item [e.g., ‘pleasant’]). To rule out this possible
explanation for the results, the regression analysis presented in the main text was re-run with explicit and implicit attitude
measures that were computed using just the cognitive attitude items and, again, using just affective attitude items. In both cases,
the pattern of results was the same as reported in Table 4.
4 The positive attitude dimensions (both explicit and implicit) had slightly better internal reliabilities and larger standard deviations
than did the negative attitude dimensions (see Method section). This raises the possibility that the larger standardized regression
coefficients for the positive versus negative attitude dimensions were attributable to differential regression attenuation or
differences inmeasurement variance (e.g., Goodwin& Leech, 2006). To rule out differential regression attenuation, the regression
presented in the main text was re-run using the disattenuated correlation matrix (e.g., Muchinsky, 1996). The pattern of findings
was the same as presented in Table 4. To rule out measurement variance, the variance within each attitude measure was
calculated. Two repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were then conducted testing the difference in variance
between the positive and negative implicit attitude dimensions (ANOVA 1) and the positive and negative explicit attitude
dimensions (ANOVA 2). ANOVA 1 was not statistically significant, F(1, 130) = 0.172, p = .679. However, ANOVA 2 revealed
that the variability in the positive dimension of explicit attitude was greater than was the variability in the negative dimension of
explicit attitude, F(1, 130) = 15.29, p < .001. Given the procedures for estimating regression coefficients while controlling for
measurement variability are problematic (Glass & Hopkins, 1996), we therefore removed the 12 cases from the sample that
contributed most towards the variability in the explicitly measured positive attitude dimension. A repeated measures ANOVA
showed that the difference in the variability between explicitly measured positive and negative attitude dimensions was no longer
statistically significant, F(1, 118) = 3.50, p = .064. We then re-ran the regression presented in the main text with the
aforementioned 12 cases removed and the pattern of findings was the same.
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Bidimensional effects of explicit and implicit attitudes on behaviour
In support of hypothesis 1, the positive and negative dimensions of explicit attitudes
together accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in speedingbehaviour. The
positive dimensionwas also found to predict speeding behaviour to a significantly greater
extent than the negative dimension. The results from this study therefore extend the
findings from studies of unidimensional attitudes (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2001; Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993) in which attitudes are conceptualized as either positive or negative
evaluations. They also support the positivity bias that is typically found in previous studies
of bidimensional attitudes with the positive attitude dimension being more predictive of
behaviour than the negative dimension (Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015; McCartan & Elliott,
2018).
It is worth considering, however, that the findings are not consistent with Lawton
et al.’s (2007 [study 1]) research on expectancy beliefs about speeding in which beliefs
about the likelihood of negative affective outcomes had larger standardized regression
weights in the prediction of speeding behaviour than did beliefs about the likelihood of
positive affective outcomes. The reason for the discrepancy is unlikely to be a result of
Lawton et al. (2007) focusing on affective beliefs and the present research focusing on
attitudesmore generally (i.e., overallmeasures of cognitive plus affective attitudes). This is
because supplementary analyses showed that the positive dimension of attitude still
predicted behaviour to a greater extent than the negative dimension when cognitive and
affective attitudeswere separated (see footnote 3). One possible reason for the discrepant
finding is that themean age of the drivers in this samplewas 23 years, and in Lawton et al.
(2007 [study 1]), it was 49 years. It is possible that the older sample used in Lawton et al.
(2007 [study 1]) had accumulated more experience of the negative consequences of
speeding, thus reinforcing their beliefs about the negative outcomes of this behaviour,
which in turn would be expected to increase the relationship with behaviour (cf. Fazio &
Zanna, 1981). However, in Elliott, Brewster, et al. (2015 [study 3]), the mean age of the
samplewas 56 years. That study also focused on recent speed limit offenders, all ofwhom
had received a recent negative outcome for their behaviour (being caught by the police in
the last 4 months). It was still found that the positive dimension of attitude was more
predictive of subsequent speeding than was the negative dimension, in line with the
findings of this study and most other studies of outcome beliefs (e.g., Anderson et al.,
2002; Fromme et al., 1997; Lawton et al., 2007 [study 2]; Lee et al., 1999; Rhodes &
Conner, 2010). Although future research might usefully identify the conditions under
which the positive dimension of attitude ismore predictive of behaviour than the negative
dimension (and vice versa), the present findings are consistent with the idea that the
positive dimension of attitude is, in general, the primary dictator of behaviour, with
individuals’ evaluations of positive behavioural outcomes outweighing their evaluations
of negative behavioural outcomes when deciding to act (but see Lawton et al., 2007
[study 1]).
It is also worth noting that the negative dimension of explicit attitude was not a
significant predictor of behaviour in this study. While it has been shown to predict
behaviour in previous research, alongwith thepositive dimension, the effect size has been
small. For example, Elliott, Brewster, et al. (2015 [study 3]) showed that the beta-weight
for the negative dimension of explicit attitude in the prediction of speeding behaviour on
both urban and rural roads was just b = .11 (comparedwith b = .31 and b = .38 for the
positive attitude dimension on urban and rural roads, respectively). Thus, the evidence,
overall, illustrates the utility of the positive attitude dimension in the prediction of
behaviour at the expense of the negative attitude dimension.
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In support of hypothesis 2, this study demonstrated that the positive and negative
dimensions of implicit attitudes together accounted for a significant increment to
explained variance in speeding behaviour over and above the variance thatwas accounted
for by the positive and negative dimensions of explicit attitudes. This finding is therefore
in line with research on unidimensional attitudes in which implicit measures of attitudes
have been found to add variance to behaviour over and above explicit attitudes (e.g.,
Greenwald et al., 2009). The findings imply that spontaneous processes, tapped by
implicit attitudes, are important in dictating behaviour along with more deliberative,
controlled processes, tapped by explicit attitudes (see Fazio, 1990). Additionally, it is
worth noting that the explicit and implicit attitude measures of bidimensional attitudes
were uncorrelated in this study, indicating that the measures tapped conceptually
different types of attitudes that independently predicted behaviour, consistent with
research on unidimensional attitudes (see Perugini, 2005; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler,
2000).
Also in support of hypothesis 2, the positive dimension of implicit attitude was a
significantly stronger independent predictor of speeding behaviour thanwas the negative
dimension. The results therefore demonstrate, for the first time, that the positivity bias
found with explicit bidimensional attitude–behaviour relationships generalize to implicit
bidimensional attitude–behaviour relationships. The implication is that behaviour is
dictated by evaluations of positive behavioural outcomes at the expense of the negative
behavioural outcomes at both the explicit level of cognitive functioning (i.e., when an
individual has the motivation and opportunity to think about what action to take) and the
implicit level (i.e., when behaviour is more reactive or automatic).
The positivity bias that was found with regard to implicit bidimensional attitudes is
particularly important because bidimensional attitudes have been measured in previous
research using self-reported questionnaires, which can be criticized for being susceptible
to cognitive (e.g., Murdock, 1962), affective (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995), and self-
presentation biases (e.g., Gur & Sackeim, 1979; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). On the other
hand, measures of implicit attitudes from IATs are less vulnerable to these criticisms (e.g.,
Banse et al., 2001). The positivity bias found in previous studies of explicit bidimensional
attitudes, with the positive dimension predicting speeding behaviour to a significantly
greater extent than the negative dimension (e.g., Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015; McCartan
& Elliott, 2018), can therefore be held with greater confidence.
Implications for behaviour-change interventions
The finding that the positive dimension of explicit attitude was a stronger predictor of
speeding behaviour than was the negative dimension has important implications for
behaviour-change interventions (e.g., road safety education). The finding suggests that
interventions focusing on explicit attitudes should primarily aim to address the positive
outcomes of speeding. For instance, interventions could reinforce the idea that many of
the positive outcomes of speeding (e.g., reaching one’s destination more quickly) are not
likely in many circumstances (e.g., road and traffic conditions often tend to reduce any
time savings). Conversely, the finding that the negative attitude dimension did not
independently predict speeding suggests that behaviour-change interventions are likely
to bemetwith limited success if they target only negative outcomes. Indeed, interventions
that aim to improve road safety (see Carey, McDermott, & Sarma, 2013; Parker, Stradling,
& Manstead, 1996; Stead, Mackintosh, Tagg, & Eadie, 2002) and health more generally
(see Conner & Norman, 2005) typically focus on the negative outcomes of risky
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behaviours and the long history of such fear inducing messages having a rather limited
effect on behaviour is consistent with the results of this study. More generally, research in
road safety has shown that educational interventions that focus on drivers’ attitudes are
generally ineffective at modifying driving behaviour and crash risk (Helman, Grayson, &
Parkes, 2010; Kinnear et al., 2013). Failure to target interventions appropriately is a
possible explanation for this finding.
The finding that implicit attitudes predicted behaviour over and above explicit
attitudes also has important implications for behaviour-change interventions. Specifically,
the findings imply that interventions are needed to focus on the automatic (implicit)
cognitive processes that guide behaviour in addition tomore rational (explicit) processes.
‘Evaluative conditioning’ tasks (e.g., Olsen & Fazio, 2001, 2006) are designed to alter
implicit associations between behaviours (e.g., speeding) and evaluative attributes (e.g.,
‘good’). Such tasks might be useful for changing implicit attitudes towards speeding. In
line with the findings of this study, such tasks would need to target implicit associations
between speeding and positive, rather than negative, evaluative responses. Alternatively,
interventions might usefully prevent implicit attitudes from guiding behaviour in the first
place. For example, ‘thought stopping’ tasks (e.g., Foa et al., 2005) are known to prevent
unwanted cognitions. Such tasks might therefore be able to prevent the positive
dimension of implicit attitudes from being activated automatically in response to salient
cues associated with speeding and therefore prevent this risky behaviour from being
primed. More generally, given that both explicit and implicit attitudes independently
predicted speeding in this study, a multipronged intervention approach is recommended
throughwhich the positive dimensions of both explicit and implicit attitudes are targeted
(e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Further research is needed to test the sorts of
interventions discussed above.
Methodological considerations
While this study has important implications for both theory and practice, a number of
methodological features need to be considered when interpreting the data. First, the
sample comprised mainly university students, which resulted in a sample that was
younger than the UK driving population (mean age: 22.66 years old vs. 48.8 years old for
the UK driving population; DVLA, 2016). However, it is well established that young
drivers are overrepresented in traffic crashes (Department for Transport, 2016).
Identifying the constructs (e.g., attitudes) that contribute towards the risk-increasing
behaviours of this group (e.g., speeding) is therefore important. It is alsoworth re-iterating
that the pattern of findingswas broadly consistentwith previous studies on bidimensional
attitudes inwhich participantswere non-university students (e.g., Elliott, Brewster, et al.,
2015 [study 3]).
A second methodological feature of this study that needs to be considered when
interpreting the results is that behaviour was measured in a driving simulator rather than
the real world. As discussed in the Method section, the simulator used in this study has
been shown to generate measures of speeding behaviour that significantly correlate with
self-reportedmeasures of real-world speeding.More importantly, the sameconstructs that
typically predict speeding in the real world (e.g., age, driving experience, behavioural
intentions, perceived behavioural control, and moral norm) have been shown to predict
speeding on the driving simulator. This supports the findings fromother validation studies
of driving simulators more generally (e.g., Helman & Reed, 2015). It is also important to
note that driving simulators enable the measurement of objective behaviour under full
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experimental control, in which all participants are exposed to the same environmental
conditions. Therefore, they eliminate confounding factors that are often found in the real
world (e.g., experience of difficult traffic conditions across participants).
A third methodological feature of the present study that needs to be considered is that
implicit attitudes were measured using single-attribute IATs, in which a single-attribute
category (e.g., ‘good’ or ‘bad’) was paired with either ‘speeding’ or ‘complying’ and
participantswere asked to categorize target items relating to the three categories. The risk
is that the IATs might have been measuring attitudes towards complying with the speed
limit rather than attitudes towards exceeding the speed limit. This is potentially
problematic because research has demonstrated that ‘doing’ cognitions (i.e., cognitions
that relate to performance of a behaviour such as speeding) are separate from ‘not doing’
cognitions (i.e., cognitions that relate to not performing a behaviour such as avoiding
speeding, or complying with the speed limit; e.g., Richetin, Conner, & Perugini, 2011).
However, attitudes towards exceeding the speed limit and attitudes towards complying
with the speed limit are usually found to be highly correlated and therefore typically have
the same predictive utility (see Conner et al., 2007; Elliott, 2012; Elliott, Armitage, &
Baughan, 2003; Letirand & Delhomme, 2005). Furthermore, the IATs developed for this
study were shown to be psychometrically reliable and the finding that the positive
dimensions of both explicit and implicit attitudes were stronger predictors of behaviour
thanwere the negative dimensions provides evidence of construct validity. Future studies
might usefully employ the single-attribute IATs developed in this study, along with
measures of explicit attitudes, to test bidimensional attitude–behaviour relationshipswith
regard to behaviours other than speeding.
A fourth methodological feature of this study is that the measures of explicit attitudes
(both dimensions) were based primarily on items that tapped cognitive attitudes rather
than affective attitudeswhereas themeasures of implicit attitudes (both dimensions)were
basedprimarily on attribute items that tapped affective attitudes. This raises thepossibility
that the implicit attitude measures accounted for additional variance in behaviour over
and above the variance accounted for by the explicit attitude measures because affective
attitudes are generally stronger predictors. However, it was found that implicit attitudes
still accounted for additional variance in speeding behaviour over and above the variance
accounted for by explicit attitudeswhenwe separated the cognitive and affective attitude
items (see footnote 3). Although this research was not designed to address the distinction
between cognitive and affective attitudes, and future research might usefully do so (e.g.,
by developing separate IATs for cognitive and affective attitudes), the conclusion that
implicit bidimensional attitudes increase the prediction of behaviour over and above
explicit bidimensional attitudes seems to hold for both cognitive and affective attitudes.
A fifth methodological feature of this study that is worthy of discussion is that the
positive dimensions of both explicit and implicit attitudes were marginally more reliable
than were the measures of the negative dimensions. This raises the possibility that
differential regression attenuation (e.g., Goodwin & Leech, 2006) accounted for the
greater prediction of behaviour by the positive attitude dimensions compared with the
negative attitude dimensions. However, the positive dimensions of both explicit and
implicit attitudespredicted behaviour to a greater extent than did thenegative dimensions
even when controlling for the differences in measurement reliability (see footnote 4).
A final methodological feature that needs to be considered is that the standard
deviations for the positive attitude dimensions were greater than were the standard
deviations for the negative attitude dimensions, meaning differences in measurement
variabilitymay also have accounted for the greater prediction of behaviour by the positive
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attitude dimensions. However, the variances of the positive and negative dimensions of
implicit attitudes were not statistically significant. While the variance in the positive
dimension of explicit attitude was greater than was the variance in the negative
dimension, the positive dimensionwas still a significantly stronger predictor of behaviour
even when correcting for the difference (see footnote 4).
Conclusions
This research shows that the positive attitude dimension is a stronger predictor of
behaviour than was the negative dimension and therefore supports the positivity bias
found in previous studies of the bidimensional attitude–behaviour relationship (e.g.,
Elliott, Brewster, et al., 2015;McCartan & Elliott, 2018). This result was found for explicit
attitudes and, for the first time, implicit attitudes. Attitude-change interventions might
usefully target the positive dimension of both explicit and implicit attitudes. Further
research is needed to test the effectiveness of these interventions.
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